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ABSTRACT
Recent evidence showing that men often take over women's loans challenges the
assumption that providing credit to women strengthens their economic roles in the
household and therefore empowers them. This thesis examines the mechanisms by which
participation in credit programs may change women's lives and provides
recommendations on how to maximize the impact of these programs.
The analysis shows that when credit enters the household, a number of different scenarios
are possible, some of which bring about positive changes in women's lives and others
which place them in situations of greater dependency and subordination. Where women
do control their loans and are able to become income earners, credit can have an
empowering effect. The paper describes the different strategies that organizations have
employed to try and ensure that women are involved in the loan financed activity, but
highlights the difficulties with these approaches. The discussion shows that until the
institutional and cultural barriers that prevent women from investing in productive
activities and accessing the market are broken, it will continue to be difficult for
organizations to control loan use.
Even if organizations cannot directly control loan use, they can take steps to ensure that
the empowering effects of credit programs are maximized. This can be done by
encouraging women to gain knowledge of the market, of accounting practices, and of the
profitability of economic ventures, even if they are not in charge of them. It can also be
done through the building up of assets like savings, land and capital, as well as through the
consciousness raising and awareness building efforts that some organizations have
developed. The only way these can be achieved, however, is if they are made into explicit
program goals, and consequently, if indicators for their measurement are developed and
utilized in standard impact evaluations of the programs.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
I. The Growth of Credit Programs for Women
Governments, NGOs, and international donor organizations alike currently see credit
programs for the poor as the key to the alleviation of poverty. Where before the poor were
regarded as high credit risks because they lack education, skills and collateral, the success of
organizations like the Grameen Bank at organizing the rural poor into solidarity groups to get
loans and repay them has prompted development organizations all over the world to provide
credit to the poor. Countries as diverse as Colombia, Malaysia, Kenya, the Philippines, and
even some states in the United States (Arkansas, Illinois) now have instituted credit programs
based on the Grameen Bank model. In June 1995, the World Bank and other donors formed
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest which consists of a $200 million grant fund for
organizations that give loans to the poor. At the United Nations Conference on Women in
Beijing in September 1995, credit programs were heralded as one of the primary ways of
reaching the poor, many of whom are women.
The key to this rapid proliferation of credit programs has been their remarkably high
repayment rates. Organizations that have followed the Grameen Bank model have generally
shown repayment rates of over 90%. Not only have the poor proved themselves to be good
credit risks, women have shown that they are better at repayment than men. The trend for
the last decade or so has thus been towards organizing women for the provision of credit.
Other than being good credit risks, two reasons are generally given to justify this escalation of
credit for women:
- Women's participation in credit programs has a beneficial impact on households through
improved incomes, nutrition and education of children (Pitt and Khandker 1994, Hussain
1988, and others)
- In cultures that are often extremely restrictive towards women, giving control of financial
resources to women is seen as a way of addressing women's needs and interests, and
improving their status in the household and in society--i.e. credit is seen as a means of
empowering women (Rahman 1986, Mizan 1994, Schuler and Hashemi 1994, and others)
Most studies of credit programs concentrate on the first issue of their impact on household
incomes, nutrition and children's education. Fewer people have tried to measure their impact
on women for obvious reasons: empowerment is an ideological, value laden concept that is
difficult to measure empirically. Regardless of which aspect of credit programs is examined,
an assumption that underlies most impact evaluation studies is that giving loans to women
strengthens their economic roles. This enhanced economic role is expected to give women
more autonomy and control over important decisions in the household, and to contribute to
their self-confidence and their ability to plan for their future.
II. The Controversy
This last assumption has recently been brought into question in a study by Anne Marie
Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta (1994) which shows that, for a sample of 253 Bangladeshi
households, women actually do not always retain control over the money once they have
taken out the loan. In their study they find that:
(a) 22% of the women have no idea how their money is being used because the male members
of the households have taken control of the loan;
(b) 17% have minimal involvement (usually labour) in the use to which the money is put,
leaving male members of the household to deal with all of the major decisions and
managerial aspects of the investment;
(c) 24% have only partial involvement in the managerial aspects of the investment but feel
that they have very little say in any major decisions regarding the investment; and
(d) 37% were able to retain full or significant control over the loan.
To some, these percentages might be shocking. If a majority of women are not using the
loans themselves and merely passing the money on to their husbands or sons, what does that
say about the ability of credit programs to change women's economic positions within the
household and empower them? Others might argue that the percentages are high given the
cultural context of Bangladesh, and the extremely restrictive attitudes towards women there--
the very fact that even 37% of the women in Goetz and Sen Gupta's study have full or
significant control over loans might be quite impressive in a society where women are
traditionally bound by the "purdah" system and expected to stay at home and out of sight of
society.1 Whatever one's response to the statistics is, the assumption that credit for women
enhances their economic roles in the household, and therefore empowers them, is threatened
by the findings.
1 The meaning and connotations of "purdah" are defined in greater detail in Chapter Two
Goetz and Sen Gupta's study created a major controversy both in Bangladesh and among the
donor community which has espoused the Grameen Bank style of credit delivery for rural
women as one of the best ways of alleviating poverty and empowering women. Besides
questioning the methodology Goetz and Sen Gupta used to measure "control of resources",
the main criticism of the study was that there are enough studies around that show the
significant positive impact that women's credit has had on raising incomes in the family and
improving health and nutrition, both of children and of women. Given the cultural context of
Bangladesh, male appropriation of women's loans is a non-issue. Development is a process,
they say, and social change takes time. The first step should be to get the poor out of the
cycle of poverty. Credit programs are not only achieving this, in addition, they are changing
women's lives significantly. As a first step, they claim, that is enough. 2
III. The Importance of Loan Use and Control
a. Understanding the mechanisms by which credit works
Development organizations assume that by giving credit to women, women will invest the
money in a successful enterprise, women will become income earners, and women's economic
roles will be strengthened. As a result of this strengthened economic position, they will gain
autonomy in the household and have greater control over decisions affecting them. The
evidence of male appropriation knocks a hole into this chain of events. If women are not
using the loans themselves (i.e. not becoming income earners), are they becoming empowered
at all? How do they gain in status and have greater decision making power? The evidence of
male appropriation makes us question how we infer the cause-and-effect relationship
between improving access of credit to women and women's empowerment. If this
relationship is different than what has been presumed, it could in turn have a bearing on how
evaluators actually measure the impact of credit on women.
b. Other possible effects of targeting women for credit
If we, as academics and development practitioners, have not understood the mechanisms by
which targeted credit brings about changes within the household, this raises the possibility
that we have also not recognized that credit to women could have adverse consequences.
2 Personal communication with people who attended a November 1994 presentation by Anne Marie Goetz of
her paper (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1994) at the World Bank.
Goetz and Sen Gupta have elaborated on some situations they observed during their research
in Bangladesh.
In cases where women are not earning their own income from loans, male appropriation could
introduce greater tensions in the household because women still have the responsibility of
repaying the loan. Where the husband obliges with weekly payments on his own, if what he
provides is insufficient, women have to supplement the payment with funds from their
"expenditure saving" homestead activities like sales of eggs, fruit, homegrown vegetables, or
from their regular savings habit of reserving a handful of rice before meals ("mushti chal"). 3
This could have a negative outcome on daily consumption in the household, as well as result
in long-term depletion of resources otherwise kept for savings. Sometimes husbands are
unwilling, as opposed to unable, to pay the weekly installments. In these cases, women are
forced into pressuring the men for the money, and risk violent reactions from them. Having
access to credit might also lead to the increased commodification of women--especially in
areas where there are no organizations offering credit to men, the value of a woman might be
judged by her ability to retain membership of a credit program. The authors cite anecdotal
evidence of women who experienced increased domestic violence when they were unable to
gain membership of a credit program or had to wait too long for their turn to get a loan (Goetz
and Sen Gupta 1994).
IV. Methodology
I state earlier that credit for women has been justified on two grounds: (1) it has been shown
that giving loans to women as opposed to men has a more beneficial impact on households;
and (2) strengthening women's economic positions in the household empowers women. In
this study, I have not examined in detail the impact of credit on household welfare in general.
Since all the studies I examined point towards the generally positive role that targeted credit
plays in households, I have taken that as given. I thus do not wish to critique every aspect of
credit programs through my analysis, nor imply that credit programs are a bad intervention.
Since these programs have a dual objective, household welfare and women's empowerment, I
focus my study specifically on women.
3 These savings activities are habitual for rural women in Bangladesh. Since most women in the past did not
have other forms of income generation, the only way they could accumulate money for emergencies was by
selling produce to their neighbors or putting aside a little bit of rice at every meal--all of which could be done
easily without their husbands finding out.
This thesis examines the impact of credit on women in light of the fact that women might be
transferring their loans to male members of the household. Studies of this nature are best
done through carefully designed ethnographic studies, large-scale surveys and in-depth
interviews carried out on the same households at different points in time. This methodology
was beyond the scope of this study. However, credit programs in Bangladesh have been
widely studied and a large number of impact evaluations already exist. The controversy over
the Goetz and Sen Gupta study shows that contradictory evidence exists on the subject of
credit's impact on women. Some studies apparently show a strong positive impact, while
others like Goetz and Sen Gupta claim otherwise.
I chose to examine the existing evaluations of credit programs in detail with a view to
answering the following question:
Given that credit might not work in the way organizations have assumed it does, i.e. through
strengthening the economic positions ofwomen, what can we conclude about whether credit
programs have been successful in having a positive impact on women's lives? How does this
inform our understanding of how credit works to change women's lives?
To answer this question, I carried out a careful review of the existing literature on credit
programs in Bangladesh, including an in-depth analysis of the main impact evaluations that
have been published about them. For my analysis, I examined material on two of the largest
credit programs in Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee. The Grameen Bank, established in 1976, is a private development bank,
established for the purpose of serving the poor. During the course of its operations, it has
focused its operations more and more on women, and in 1993, 94% of its 1.8 million
members were women (Grameen Bank Annual Report 1993). The model of credit delivery
that the Grameen Bank has pioneered has been a huge success in Bangladesh, and is currently
being replicated all over the world. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)
is one of the oldest and largest development organizations in Bangladesh and started its credit
program (the Rural Development Program---RDP) in 1986. BRAC has followed the
Grameen model for its credit programs with some modifications that are described later in the
paper. In 1992, 74% of BRAC-RDP's three quarters of a million members consisted of
women (BRAC Annual Report 1993).
Although this analysis relies primarily on secondary data and existing studies, it also
incorporates the findings from five weeks of field work that I carried out with the two
organizations in January-February 1995. My field work consisted of interviews with staff
members of both organizations and in-depth interviews of 24 women borrowers, 12 each
from the Grameen Bank and from BRAC. I also attended two weekly center meetings of each
organization. The interviews and observations I made in the field stimulated many of the
questions and issues that are addressed in this paper.
The results of my analysis are organized into five parts. In Chapter Two, I give a general idea
of the status of women in Bangladesh followed by a description of the two organizations.
This section also lays out the mechanism by which credit is expected to work to improve the
lives of women. Chapter Three examines the issue of male appropriation of women's loans. I
first demonstrate that this is a phenomenon that has been observed in the past by other
evaluators, but that it was considered of little importance. I then inquire into the possible
reasons why men are taking over women's loans and show how the two organizations have
dealt with the issue. Chapter Four examines the economic impact of credit specifically on
women and shows that the indicators generally used to measure economic impact do not give
a clear picture of the impact on women's lives. For example, assuming that providing a loan
to the woman makes her an income earner and therefore empowers her, evaluators have
measured incomes and employment. However, these indicators tell us only that women are
working more hours, and tells us nothing about whether they have gained any more control
over financial resources. This chapter also highlights the fact that evaluations have had a
tendency to provide biased results in favor of credit programs. Chapter Five grapples with
the difficult issue of empowerment and the problems with defining it, and provides the
results of studies that have attempted to measure it. These studies emphasize the aspects of
credit programs, other than the actual money itself, that contribute to empowerment.
Chapter Six lays out the different possible impacts that credit could have on women, and
identifies some key variables that evaluators and program designers need to keep in mind if
credit programs are to make lasting changes to women's lives. Chapter Seven provides a
summary and conclusion.
CHAPTER TWO
Background
I. The Situation of Women in Bangladesh
According to almost any indices of quality of life or of economic development, women in
Bangladesh are disadvantaged in comparison to men. The differential treatment of females
begins at birth. In this predominantly Muslim nation (87% of a total population of 113
million follow Islam), a son is welcomed into the world with a loud joyous prayer of "God is
Great", while a daughter receives only a "whisper of a Quranic prayer" (Mizan 1994).
Mortality and malnutrition rates are higher among female than male children: mortality rates
for female children aged 1-4 are among the highest in the world, and female children have
almost three times the rate of malnutrition as males (World Bank 1990). Female children
receive less medical treatment and their school enrollment rates are lower. Table 1 shows
some of these figures. Although these are numbers only for female children, the situation
does not improve as they grow older. Literacy rates for all women, for example, are 19%
compared to 40% for men. Female wage labourers earn 40% of what male wage labourers
earn (Pitt and Khandker 1994). In fact, according to a 1988 study by the Population Crisis
Committee, on the basis of twenty indicators relating to health, marriage, children, education,
employment and social equality, the status of women in Bangladesh was ranked the lowest
world wide (World Bank 1990).
The lives of women in Bangladesh are shaped by the patrilineal, patriarchal and patrilocal
nature of the society. One of the main reasons that little attention is paid to nutrition, health
care and education of girls is the fact that they are usually married off early and go away to
join the husband's household. According to government statistics, 50% of women are married
by age 16, and 95% by age 25 (World Bank 1990). Since men are expected to be the primary
breadwinners, once a woman joins her husband's household, it is her reproductive and
nurturing role that is emphasized, rather than an economic one. She is expected to cook,
clean, take care of her husband, and look after the children and her in-laws. Although women
are actively involved in various types of economic activities, specially in the rural areas where
they engage in post-harvest agriculture, livestock/poultry rearing, and growing vegetables (for
an average of 10 to 14 hours a day) women's contribution to the household and national
economy is not measured in cash terms and hence not considered of economic value (Ahmed
et al 1994).
Table 1
Selected Demographic Indicators for Women in Bangladesh
FEMALE __L
Population (1990) 55 million 58 million
Infant Mortality 105 - 125 90- 115
(per 1000 live births)
Child Mortality - ages 1-4 16 13
(per 1000 population)
School Enrollment Ratio (1986)
(% of age group)
Primary school 50% 69%
Secondary school 11% 24%
Literacy Rates (1981) 19% 40%
Source: World Bank 1990
Poverty makes the situation for women even worse. Poor women have almost no economic
assets of their own (land, cash savings, etc.), and compounded with their general lack of
education, marketable skills or even awareness of their legal rights, they are particularly
vulnerable. Should their husbands desert them or divorce them (which many do, without
following due legal process), they have no way of supporting themselves. Hence, for fear of
abandonment and in an effort to keep their husbands happy and their families intact, they
often deprive themselves (and their daughters) of food and other comforts and normally do
not protest abuse and ill treatment.
A large majority of women in Bangladesh (88% in 1990) live in rural areas. One of the main
differences between urban and rural women is the social/religious custom of "purdah", which
is much more rigorously enforced in the rural areas than in the cities. Purdah, literally
meaning curtain, is an institution designed ostensibly to guard women's "honor". It imposes
strict sanctions against women's physical mobility (women are expected to stay within the
homestead or the area immediately surrounding it), their attire (they are expected to cover
themselves up entirely, including their heads and sometimes even faces in the presence of
men), and their conduct in front of men (they are expected to be unassertive and not attract
attention to themselves). Almost every aspect of purdah ensures women's subordination to
men. The isolation that purdah imposes makes it difficult for women to, among other things,
take part in income generating activities or take advantage of services such as health and
family planning, all activities that would require them to travel to and operate in public
spaces on their own. However, as Hashemi and Schuler (1993) point out, "... such behaviour
is so internalized by women that the system of purdah is seen by them as not only natural
but more importantly as protective of women, and therefore beneficial" (p. 3).
These traditional attitudes and customs work together to perpetuate the situation of
dependence and subordination of women. Combined with the reality of extreme poverty that
characterizes the Bangladeshi countryside, it ensures that poor rural women live under
difficult and disempowering circumstances.
11. The Grameen Bank Model
Before the advent of the Grameen Bank, access of the poor to formal credit in Bangladesh
was plagued by the usual problems associated with rural financial markets in developing
countries: a poorly extended commercial banking system; high transactions costs for lenders
for lending small sums of money; high transaction costs for borrowers who would have to
travel great distances to get to bank branches; and the poor's lack of physical collateral, to
name a few (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1994). There was also concern with the repayment
capacity of the poor because at a subsistence level, the compulsion to consume any extra
income (as opposed to investing it in productive activities) was believed to be high (Hossain
1984). In Bangladesh, the concept of lending to poor women was rarely even considered
because of the purdah system which, as mentioned above, places severe constraints on
women's ability to interact with strangers and travel outside the village.
During the 1980s, the Grameen Bank's success at giving loans specifically to poor rural
women and getting repayment rates of over 95% challenged these presumptions. The model
that brought Grameen its fame is the model of group collateral or group lending. Grameen
asks its members to organize into groups of five before giving out loans. Although loans are
given to individuals, each member is individually as well as collectively responsible for loan
repayments: should one member default on a payment, her group has to cover for her.
Defaulters may jeopardize their own as well as the entire group's ability to take out more
loans in the future. This built-in system of monitoring and peer pressure seems to have
worked remarkably well and is seen as the principal reason for the unusually high repayment
rates that Grameen has experienced4.
4 See Jain 1996 which challenges this assumption also.
The Grameen Bank was initiated in 1976 by a professor of Economics, Mohammad Yunus,
out of a genuine concern with raising the most disadvantaged groups in society out of
poverty. Early on, Grameen established a targeting strategy: loans are only given to landless
and assetless villagers, i.e. those who own less than half an acre of land and whose combined
possessions have a value of less than one acre of medium quality land. During the first few
years of experimentation (Grameen was formalized as a development bank in 1983),
Professor Yunus discovered that women were doubly disadvantaged--exploited within their
families and belonging to the families that were most exploited. Since the early 1980s,
therefore, Grameen has been specifically targeting women. From a total of about 9,400
women or 39% of total membership in 1981, in 1993 women constituted 94% of Grameen's
1.8 million members (Grameen Bank Annual Report 1993).
III. The Expected Impact of Credit Programs on Women
In a society where a mere 2.5 million women (or 9% of the total labour force) are
"employed" 5, it is expected that when loans are given to women, at the most basic level,
women will invest the money in a productive economic venture, and will become income
earners in the family. Cash earnings and a regular income will strengthen their economic roles
within the household, give them more autonomy and control over important decisions, raise
their self-confidence and self-esteem and gain them respect within their families.
Grameen's mode of operation includes a number of features that are expected to have
additional benefits for women. Each group of five members elects a chairperson and a
secretary, positions which rotate among the group annually so that each member benefits
from the leadership and responsibility that come with the positions. The chairperson is
responsible for discipline within the group and monitors loan activity. Five or six groups
within the same village form a center and group chairpersons elect a center chief. The center
chief is responsible for attendance at weekly meetings, payments of loan installments, and
overall discipline. Bank workers attend weekly center meetings and collect loan repayments.
Members have to travel to the local branch office to take out a loan (each loan has to be
countersigned by the group chairperson). The loan can be used for any productive activity,
5 According to a national Labor Force Survey of 1984-85, these women worked as employees (51%), were self-
employed (16%), worked as day labourers (13%) or as unpaid family workers (13%), the balance not being
reported (World Bank 1990).
but has to be put to use immediately as repayments begin two weeks after the loan agreement
is signed. The principal plus interest has to be repaid on a weekly basis within one year. In
addition, each member is required to deposit money regularly into a number of savings
schemes.
In rural Bangladesh, where poor women in the past had virtually no access to credit, did not
earn cash incomes, rarely held positions of leadership, and rarely owned any material assets,
let alone have savings, all these features of the Grameen model were expected to change the
lives of women.
IV. Comparing the Grameen Bank and BRAC
The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is one of the largest non-
government organizations in the country. It has two major goals: poverty alleviation and
empowerment of the poor. Established in 1972 by F. H. Abed, BRAC gained fame in
Bangladesh over the years through its innovative education and health programs. BRAC's
Non Formal Primary Education program, especially, has been so successful that it has been
replicated by many other NGOs in Bangladesh and has received worldwide attention--
UNICEF and OXFAM have both adopted this model for many of their projects (Lovell
1992). It was only in 1986 that BRAC shifted its emphasis and launched a large-scale credit
scheme, the Rural Development Program (RDP). Since then, RDP has grown at an extremely
rapid pace, and by 1993, it had over a million members and was taking up over 40% of
BRAC's total budget (BRAC Annual Report 1993). RDP too has been focusing increasingly
on women, and in 1992, 74% of about 670,000 members were women (Goetz and Sen Gupta
1994).
Drawing comparisons between the Grameen Bank and BRAC is particularly salient for a
number of reasons:
- BRAC has modeled its credit program, RDP, after the Grameen model. The basic
features of group lending, compulsory savings, weekly repayments, rotating leadership,
interaction with organization staff and branch offices, etc., exist in the BRAC program as
well. Thus, the mechanisms by which women are expected to be empowered are the
same in both organizations.
. In terms of scale, the organizations are similar, both having achieved wide coverage
throughout the Bangladeshi countryside (over 30,000 villages each), and both serving over
a million members (see Table 2).
- Both organizations were founded and continue to be headed by charismatic leaders who
have demonstrated a deep commitment to improving the conditions of the poor in
Bangladesh.
Table 2
Selected Statistics on the Grameen Bank and BRAC
GRAMEEN BANK BRAC
Originated 1976 as action-research project 1972 as a relief organization
1983 formalized as a bank 1986 started credit operations
through the Rural Development
Program (RDP)
Coverage (as of December 1993)
Number of villages 33, 667 35, 272 (20, 033 under RDP)
Number of members 1,814,916 1,029,119
Number of women loanees 1,585,483
Credit and Savings (cumulative to
December 1993, in million Taka)
Amount disbursed 26, 056 3,884
Amount repaid 19,889 2,820
Savings 2,334 (Group and Emergency 451 (including Group Trust Fund)
I Funds)
Source: Grameen Bank Annual Report 1993
BRAC Annual Report 1993
In discussions of the social impact of credit programs, one of the biggest differences between
Grameen and BRAC that is most often highlighted is the fact that Grameen is a private bank
whereas BRAC is an NGO. Being a bank, Grameen has to cover costs through the interest it
charges on loans, and therefore must have, as its primary motive, loan recovery. As its
founder, Professor Yunus, often states: "Ours is a bank. The rural poor are its clients. We
give loans to them. We are happy as long as they repay the loans in time. We are in
business." (A. Rahman 1986, p. 1). BRAC, on the other hand, is an NGO with explicit goals
of alleviating poverty and empowering the poor. Although organizationally BRAC has
changed and evolved over the years (it started out in 1972 as a relief organization), one
guiding principle that has remained constant in its operations is the philosophy of
"conscientization" as conceptualized by Paulo Freire--that is, raising the capacity of the poor
(or the disadvantaged, women included) to understand their situations in relation to the
economy and society they interact in, and enabling them to analyze the reasons they face a
particular set of circumstances (Lovell 1992). If indeed credit programs are going to bring
about a transformation in women's lives, BRAC's experience with serving women (its first
program specifically targeting women was initiated in 1975), combined with this philosophy
of conscientization, one would expect, would make BRAC more sensitive to the needs and
situations of women and therefore better able to affect social change. Also, since 55% of
BRAC's income consists of grants contributions from donors, the pressures on BRAC for
loan recovery are far less than for Grameen.
In spite of the differences in orientation of the two organizations, both are actively involved
in bringing about social change and raising poor women out of a cycle of poverty and
subordination. The word 'bank' is a misnomer for Grameen, and despite what Yunus publicly
proclaims, what he emphasizes in the field more than loan repayments is the social aspect of
Grameen's work: "Amidst [Grameen] loanees you will find him mostly talking about their
group solidarity, children's education, health, nutrition, housing, and, above all, urging them to
become forward-looking, self-confident and prejudice-free 'liberated' human beings" (A.
Rahman 1986, p.1). Even when talking to bank workers, Yunus emphasizes "We are teachers
and we must not behave otherwise" (ibid.). In Grameen Bank terminology, these teachings
are labeled its "consciousness raising" efforts.
The social aspects of the two organizations' work are best represented through the series of
"decisions" or "promises" that each member has to vow to implement in her daily life. These
decisions cover issues ranging from family planning, health care, literacy and education, to
vegetable growing, the evils of dowry, and the importance of group solidarity (the full list is
given in Table 3). The values represented in these decisions are taught to members during
training courses before members are given credit. Members memorize the decisions and are
expected to repeat them at every meeting. This, along with regular interaction with staff
members, is expected to keep the decisions fresh in members' minds.
While the Grameen Bank limits its involvement in villages to its interaction with the centres,
BRAC plays a more extensive role. BRAC has chosen to conduct its credit scheme, the
RDP, through a process of "institution building". Village Organizations (VOs) consisting of
between 20 and 55 members are first formed (VOs are single sex), and all members are
required to take a month long "functional education" course focusing on basic conscientization
Table 3
Consciousness Raising Efforts
Grameen Bank's Sixteen Decisions
1. We shall follow and advance the four principles of Grameen Bank --
Discipline, Unity, Courage and Hard Work-- in all walks of our lives.
2. Prosperity we shall bring to our families.
3. We shall not live in dilapidated houses. We shall repair our houses
and work towards constructing new houses at the earliest.
4. We shall grow vegetables all year round. We shall eat plenty of them
and sell the surplus.
5. During the plantation season, we shall plant as many seedlings as
possible.
6. We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize our
expenditures. We shall look after our health.
7. We shall educate our children and ensure that we can earn to pay for
their education.
8. We shall always keep our children and the environment clean.
9. We shall build and use pit-latrines.
10. We shall drink water from tubewells. If it is not available, we shall
boil water or use alum.
11. We shall not take any dowry at our sons' weddings, neither shall we
give any dowry at our daughters' weddings. We shall keep the centre
free from the curse of dowry. We shall not practice child marriage.
12. We shall not inflict any injustice on anyone, neither shall we allow
anyone to do so.
13. We shall collectively undertake bigger investments for higher
incomes.
14. We shall always be ready to help each other. If anyone is in
difficulty, we shall all help him or her.
15. If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any centre, we
shall all go there and help restore discipline.
16. We shall introduce physical exercise in all our Centres. We shall
take part in all social activities collectively.
BRAC's Seventeen Promises
1. We shall not do malpractice and injustice.
2. We shall work hard and bring prosperity to our family.
3. We shall send our children to school.
4. We shall adopt family planning and keep our family size small.
5. We shall try to be clean and keep our house tidy.
6. We shall always drink pure water.
7. We shall not keep our food uncovered and will wash our hands and
face before we take our meal.
8. We shall construct latrines and shall not leave our stool where it
doesn't belong.
9. We shall cultivate vegetables and trees in and around our house.
10. We shall try to help others under all circumstances.
11. We shall fight against polygamy and injustices to our wives and all
women.
12. We shall be loyal to the Organization and abide by its rules and
regulations.
13. We shall not sign anything without having a good understanding of
what it means (we will look carefully before we act).
14. We shall attend weekly meetings regularly and on time.
15. We shall always abide by the decisions of the weekly group meetings.
16. We shall regularly deposit our weekly savings.
17. If we receive a loan we shall repay it on time.
and awareness building (see Table 3, BRAC's Seventeen Promises) 6. Over a three to six
month period, members are expected to develop solidarity and trust and to establish a savings
discipline; only then do they become eligible for credit. Through the solidarity building
process, the credit operations, and bi-monthly issue-based meetings (to discuss issues such
dowry, education, etc.), BRAC hopes that VOs will develop into institutions through which
the poor will become mobilized, learn to articulate their needs and interests, mobilize
resources, and plan for participation in activities such as education, health, social welfare and
ultimately, politics (Mustafa 1995). BRAC thus has a broad social change agenda through
RDP. 7
In summary, BRAC and Grameen are comparable programs, based on similar models of credit
delivery for rural women. Despite the fact that one is a bank and the other an NGO, both are
interested and actively involved in trying to bring about social change in villages, teaching
villagers, especially women, about education, family planning, and nutrition, and helping to
raise their self-confidence and self-esteem. Although organizationally they are different, the
way their credit programs are designed implies that the mechanisms by which credit is
expected to change the lives of women are the same. It is this impact that forms the subject
of the chapters following.
6 An additional thirty lessons focusing on literacy and numeracy are also available and are taken by about 50%
of the members (Lovell 1992).
7 It should be mentioned here that as of 1990, BRAC started its own bank called the Rural Credit Project
(RCP). RCP is designed as a "self-sustaining, self-financing entity that provides banking services to members
of mature VOs who 'graduate' [from RDP] to the bank" (Lovell 1992, p. 49). Mature VOs are those that have
reached an adequate level of social development and in which the members' savings and loan activities are
sufficient to cover ongoing operating costs of credit and savings activities. VOs have to have been a member of
RDP for a minimum of four years before they are eligible to graduate to RCP.
CHAPTER THREE
Male Appropriation of Women's Loans
Women in Bangladesh face particularly difficult economic and cultural constraints. In this
environment, by focusing on women as economic actors, Grameen style credit programs are
expected to fundamentally change women's lives. Both the Grameen Bank and BRAC have
been studied widely. Although these studies use different criteria to measure impact, they all
lead to the same general conclusion: credit programs have been a blessing for the rural poor in
Bangladesh. They have contributed (to varying degrees according to different studies) to
increased incomes; improved nutritional status, especially of women and children; increased
expenditure on children's education, on housing, and on health; increased employment and
wages; increased capital accumulation and savings; and increased productivity (see Hossain
1988, Pit and Khandker 1994, R. Rahman 1986). This positive impact, combined with
unusually high loan recovery rates (averaging over 90%), has led the rapid spread of Grameen
style credit programs not only throughout Bangladesh, but all over the world.
In the midst of the glowing reviews of the success of credit programs, Goetz and Sen Gupta
(1994) raise an important issue regarding loan use and control of credit within the household.
They show that a majority of women who participate in credit programs actually retain very
little control over their loans, handing over the entire amount or part of it to their husbands or
other male members of the family. According to their study, of the 253 women interviewed,
63% fell in the categories of having partial, very limited or no control over their loans; only
18% had full control over the loan financed activity while only about 20% had significant
control8 9. With such large percentages of women losing control over their loans, Goetz and
Sen Gupta conclude that credit programs are not providing women with the means of
financial empowerment as they claim they do.
8 FULL = full control over the entire productive process, including marketing
SIGNIFICANT = control over every aspect of the productive process with the exception of marketing (e.g.
women will invest the loan money in a milch cow, but a male member of the household will buy the cow
and sell the milk since women rarely buy and sell in markets in Bangladesh)
PARTIAL = loss of managerial control over the productive process, but provision of substantial input of
labour (e.g. paddy husking, where the men provide the inputs and women do the work, but have little say in
the volume of weekly production)
LIMITED = minimal input into the productive process (e.g. men grow vegetables in the fields and the
women wash the vegetables for the men to sell)
NO INVOLVEMENT = the women stated they had no idea how their men had used the money, or provided
no labour for the activity in which the money is invested (e.g. rickshaw peddling)
9 They surveyed four organizations. Of the 253 women, 106 were from BRAC, 53 from Grameen, 39 from a
women's NGO (TMSS) and 15 from the government's credit program (RD-12).
In this chapter, I examine what existing impact evaluation studies of BRAC and Grameen can
tell us about women's use of credit. Using the results of these studies and from my own
observations in the field, I then lay out possible reasons for why and under what
circumstances women are likely to lose control over their loans. I close by describing how the
two organizations have responded to this issue.
I. Evidence of Male Appropriation
Almost all the impact evaluations I studied allude to the fact that men often use women's
loans (see Annex for a list of impact evaluations studied). However, this phenomenon is
rarely regarded as an "issue" that has required much discussion or consideration.
R. Rahman in a 1986 study showed that 12% of a sample of 151 Grameen Bank women
handed over the entire amount of the loan to their husbands or male guardians, while 77%
gave up to one-fourth of their borrowed money over to male members. Rahman considers
these results an achievement. In a patriarchal rural society where women have so little
mobility, the fact that such a large percentage of women are actually using up to three-
quarters of the loan themselves could be considered quite impressive. Hossain's 1988 study
of Grameen Bank loanees shows that of 534 women participants, about 20% of women
reported themselves as being "unemployed" even after they took out loans, implying that
they did not use their credit to earn cash incomes and probably handed the loans to their
husbands or other members in the household. Hossain explains this by saying that these
women may have been engaged in activities like livestock raising or cottage industry as "part-
time workers", and may not have considered this as "employment".
Studies of credit programs other than Grameen show similar results. White's 1991 survey of
140 women in ActionAid (an NGO) shows that 50% of loans taken by women were being
used for traditionally male activities, and therefore probably being controlled by men.
Hossain and Afsar, in their survey of the impact of six credit programs on women (Hossain
and Afsar 1989), cite a study of another NGO, the Women's Entrepreneurship Development
Program, which reveals that 20% of women borrowers had no involvement in their loan
investments, 25% were actually workers in their husband's businesses, 35% were doing joint
businesses with their husbands and only 19% managed their own enterprise. For an
overwhelming majority of respondents, the husbands and fathers decided on the type of
investment (73%), maintained accounts (63%), and sold the finished goods (76%).
These studies clearly indicate a significant pattern of loss of direct control over credit. During
interviews, managers at BRAC admitted that the issue of male appropriation of women's
loans was an "open secret". At Grameen, staff members also recognized that it was not
uncommon for men to use some of the loans, but did not seem to think it had reached
proportions to be concerned about. From the 14 Grameen loanees I interviewed, 8 were using
their loans for activities that their husbands dominated (renting land and harvesting crops,
petty trading, fisheries), while 5 out of 12 BRAC loanees had handed some of their loans to
their husbands (for rickshaws, harvesting land, carpentry, trading).
II. Possible Causes
The literature on Grameen and BRAC, and the results of my own field work in Bangladesh
provide a number of reasons for why and under what circumstances men tend to take over
women's loans. The problem is not that women are unaware that the loans are meant for their
own use: when I asked loanees about what kinds of things branch officers emphasized when
loans were given to them, all of them responded that the organizations made it quite clear to
them that the credit is expected to be invested by the woman, and that they should not give it
to someone else. The factors that seem to account for male appropriation are the following:
a. The problem of unemployment and underemployment
In many of the poorest areas in Bangladesh, the economic situation is so bad that even
peasants who actually own land are finding it hard to make ends meet. Thus, many landless
farmers, specially those who rely on working on other people's land for their daily wage, are
without any source of income. The problem of surplus labour in Bangladesh is well
documented and rural underemployment figures are generally estimated to be as high as 25%
(Rahman and Khandker 1995). Unemployment and underemployment was especially
evident in Jamalpur, where the majority of the BRAC members I interviewed had husbands
who previously used to sit at home with nothing to do. Once the wife of one of these men
gained access to some financial resources from BRAC, the last thing the woman wanted to do
was use the money for an income generating project that she was in charge of, while the "man
of the household" sat idle. The typical reaction from the majority of these women was "Why
should I try and use the loans myself when my husband is at home without work?".
b. The general lack of access to financial resources
BRAC and Grameen both try and reach the poorest of the rural poor through their programs-
-landless and assetless families. In a country where per capita GNP is a mere $246 per year,
the people who are at the very bottom of the income distribution never see large amounts of
money at a time. The only sources of money for these people before the advent of
organizations like BRAC and Grameen were the local moneylenders and loan sharks who, in
monopoly situations, charged exceedingly high interest rates. Under such circumstances, a
day labourer working twelve hours a day on somebody else's rice field and barely making
enough to feed his wife, his five children, his aging parents, and his unmarried younger sister
(not an uncommon situation at all), would jump at the opportunity of using the only source
of a loan with reasonable interest rates to invest in, say a rickshaw van, that would make it far
easier for him to feed his family as well as get him out of exploitative relationships with the
large powerful landowner.
The general lack of access to financial resources is compounded by the fact that even where
poor farmers previously had access to formal sources of credit, these sources have been
decreasing rapidly over the years (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1994). Between 1987 and 1991,
agricultural credit disbursements by national commercial banks (the Krishi Bank, the
Bangladesh Rural Development Board, and others) shrank by 54%, and subsidies in
agriculture have been cut due to pressure from international financial institutions like the
World Bank and the IMF. Where access to credit is so severely limited--ironically enough,
increasingly for men--and the only source of finances is through credit programs for women
(although men still receive, by far, a much greater percentage of total rural credit than
women), it often makes much more economic sense for the woman to borrow the money and
for the man to put it to productive use. Given the extent of poverty that such households
face, demanding that these women use the loans themselves regardless of what would be most
lucrative for the household, some would argue, does not make sense.
c. Productivity of women's activities and access to markets
Directly related to the above two issues is the fact that in Bangladesh gendered roles are
clearly defined--there are some activities that are traditionally "women's" activities and some
that are exclusively the domain of males. Traditional women's activities include poultry
rearing, growing vegetables, paddy husking, looking after livestock, "katha" stitching (intricate
embroidery), etc., while men's activities include agricultural labour, rickshaw peddling,
carpentry, fisheries, and stock shops, among others. The types of activities that women
participate in are further restricted by the fact that traditionally women rarely go to the
market in rural areas, and the buying and selling of goods, even those produced exclusively by
a woman's labour, is done by the men of the household.
Studies comparing productivities of men's versus women's activities are difficult to find.
Rahman and Khandker (1995) found that livestock rearing is one of the lowest return
activities, yet this is where the majority of female labour hours are invested. Looking at
participants in BRAC, BRDB and Grameen programs, they found that over 50% of the
labour hours worked by women are in livestock rearing. Interestingly, the authors also found
that the hourly return for activities carried out jointly by men and women declines sharply as
the percentage of female labour in these activities increases. They explain this finding as a
possible result of women's greater involvement in activities requiring lower capital
investments or because of lower returns on female labour vis-a-vis male labour even within
the same activity.
The combination of cultural barriers to the types of work women engage in, and their lack of
access to markets makes it difficult for women to not only control the flow of money from
their activities but also to participate in productive activities. The following case study
illustrates this clearly:
A female loanee from BRAC, Laili Begum, is the leader of her center. She has a Class
Five education and is a strong, confident woman. At the time Laili Begum borrowed
money from BRAC, her husband was unemployed. They used the money to buy a
rickshaw van which her husband drives around to transport people to nearby villages.
She says that although she would like to have her own income and be able to make the
weekly repayments of her loan ("kishti") herself, there are very few work opportunities
for her. She tried her hand at raising chicks, but they died and she made a loss. The only
other income earning possibilities she can think of are petty trading or on-loaning money
(explained below). She herself mentioned that even if she were to get involved in petty
trading, she would still have to rely on her husband to go to the market to buy goods like
flour, soap, oil, etc. in large quantities which she would then sell to her neighbors from her
house.
Petty trading, at the level Laili Begum was imagining, would be a low-productivity venture as
her market would be her neighbors, who more than likely face similar situations of poverty
and would be unable to pay high mark-up prices for basic necessities like flour and oil. On-
loaning money, the practice of making a profit by taking loans at low interest rates and
lending the money to others at higher rates, is strongly discouraged by the organizations.
Because credit is such a scarce commodity in this area, it was not uncommon for borrowers,
at some point in their membership, to have used the money for on-loaning. Even though it
could be a high return venture, there are still risks of non-repayment involved (one member
mentioned that the only year she defaulted on loan payments was the year she had on-loaned
money and the person failed to repay her), on-loaning money could hardly be called a
productive activity.
III. Organizational Responses
Grameen and BRAC both recognize the realities of the general lack of access to credit, the
problem of unemployment and of women's lack of access to productive activities. However,
both organizations decided early on that they would target women despite these problems,
because women were in an especially disadvantaged position. The two organizations chose
to achieve their goals in different ways.
BRAC gained its reputation in the Bangladeshi development scene mainly through exemplary
work in non-formal primary education and its innovative health programs in the rural areas.
Its credit program is a much newer component of its portfolio (RDP was started in 1986),
and has been growing fast in recent years: in 1993, over 40 percent of BRAC expenditures
were on its credit programs. BRAC's concern with empowerment of the poor and the overall
development of the Bangladeshi people, its broad based coverage of the country, and its size
and reputation have made it an organization that has tried to be at the cutting edge of
development issues.
Through its experience, BRAC realized that credit alone was not sufficient to alleviate
poverty--income generating and employment opportunities needed to be expanded. BRAC
thus focused its efforts in developing certain economic sub-sectors, specifically poultry and
livestock, fisheries, and sericulture. For these sub-sectors, BRAC gets involved in all aspects
of the production and sale of certain products. For example, in the poultry program, BRAC
buys from the government a special hybrid variety of chicks that the government is trying to
promote. BRAC trains its members in rearing these chicks and encourages members to use
their loans to buy the chicks from BRAC. Members rear the chicks to a salable age and then
generate income by selling the eggs or the chickens directly to BRAC. BRAC also trains and
gives loans to people to become feed makers (hybrid chicks require properly formulated feed)
and vaccinators for the chicks, and it has developed a marketing system for eggs involving
members who become egg sellers and who take trading loans to facilitate their business
(Lovell 1992).
Similar arrangements have been developed for fisheries (BRAC trains people in pisciculture
and production of certain varieties of fish which are then sold to local markets as well as to
the government), sericulture (BRAC sells silkworm eggs to members, trains them in rearing
silkworms, sells saplings of mulberry bushes--the only food that silkworms eat--to members,
trains people in spinning silk, markets the silk, etc.), and irrigation (members take loans to
buy tubewells from BRAC and derive income by selling water to farmers).
BRAC feels that these "institutional interventions" provide opportunities that do not exist in
the infrastructure-starved Bangladesh context. Lovell emphasizes their impact on women:
Think for a moment what the subsector interventions have meant to the women [Village
Organization] members. Formerly they derived income from low-yield investments in,
for example, traditional manual paddy husking, a low-paid, difficult, time-consuming task.
Women are now owning tubewell shares and deriving 20 to 30 percent profits; they are
deriving income from taking care of improved breeds of chickens with much lowered
mortality rates; they are gaining income from vaccinating chickens for their neighbors in
their spare time; they have gained expertise and income from being paravets for livestock;
they are becoming shareholders in pisciculture projects. (Lovell 1992, p. 113)
The Grameen Bank has a different philosophy. Among the myriad problems that face the
rural poor in Bangladesh, Grameen chose to deal with one specific bottleneck--that of access
to financial resources. In trying to reach the poorest of the poor, the organization discovered
that the majority of the poor are women, and the majority of women are poor. Hence, the
guiding principle of Grameen has been income generation for women to break them out of the
cycle of poverty and thereby empower them. Its programs have been organized and thought
out with that goal in mind. As described in Chapter Two, gendered roles are clearly defined
in Bangladesh--women do not drive rickshaws or vans (vehicles used to transport people or
goods), while looking after cows, poultry and vegetable gardens is usually done by women.
Grameen has an explicit policy to not loan money for activities like rickshaw pulling or
carpentry, knowing that these are not traditionally women's work, and therefore more likely
to be appropriated by men. All Grameen staff members I spoke with were very clear about
this policy and seemed to know precisely the logic behind not allowing women to borrow
money for non-traditional activities.
The strategies of poverty alleviation and empowerment that both BRAC and Grameen have
followed have built-in, if not explicit, means of trying to ensure that women use loans
themselves rather than handing over money to their husbands or male members of the family.
What has been the impact of these strategies on women and how have they been measured?
In the following two chapters, I examine this impact by analyzing in detail existing evaluation
studies of the two organizations.
CHAPTER FOUR
Economic Impact
In the last chapter, I showed that recent findings of male appropriation of women's loans
implies that the way we have understood credit to work to empower and enrich women's
lives does not necessarily stand true in the case of Bangladesh. I also demonstrate that the
two organizations I am reviewing have developed strategies to deal with this issue. What has
been the impact of their work on women? In the development community, one often hears
and reads about the beneficial impact that credit targeted to women has had on families--
improved incomes, improved health, greater school enrollment of children, etc. But these are
household indicators, showing the benefits that the entire household has received as a result
of women's participation in these programs. Having highlighted previously that there may be
a cost to women of participation, it is important to look at how the woman individually
might benefit.
The first issue I examine is the economic impact of credit on women, measured by their
income and employment. If men are taking over women's loans, one would not expect the
woman's individual income or her employment to have increased. What do the existing
evaluations tell us about incomes and employment? Before reviewing these evaluation
studies, I highlight some common limitations that most of these studies suffer from as a result
of difficulties in measuring the impact of social development projects such as these. The
remainder of the chapter analyzes the main studies that have looked specifically at women's
incomes and employment.
I. Problems With Evaluating Impact
The most common method of evaluating the impact of credit programs is to measure chosen
indicators through cross-sectional surveys comparing participants of credit programs with
non-participants. The main limitation that cross-sectional surveys are vulnerable to is
specification errors. Specification errors are "mistakes in specifying the appropriate
theoretical structure that can rule out competing explanations" (Rossi 1982, p. 238). One
such error that is particularly relevant for credit programs is sample selection bias which
often overestimates program effects (ibid, p. 239). Credit programs are likely to suffer from
sample selection bias on two fronts:
1. Where individuals self-select themselves into the program, it is possible that people who
are more motivated, more entrepreneurial, harder-working, better educated, better skilled,
and more self-assured will be the ones to join. Comparing participants with non-
participants from the same villages, who perhaps did not join precisely because they did
not possess these inherent qualities, could either overestimate the impact of the credit
program, or attribute a causality that is incorrect. For example, giving credit to a woman
with a specific skill, say sewing skills, might enable her to raise her income significantly
by enabling her to buy materials and threads and sell her output. Comparing her income
with a non-participant who does not possess any marketable skills would overestimate
the impact of the program because giving credit to the unskilled woman might not have
raised her income by as much. Similarly, observing that participants are more self-assured
than non-participants might lead evaluators to conclude that credit leads to self-
assuredness. However, this causality might not be accurate because it is possible that the
only reason these women joined the credit program in the first place was because they
were already self-confident.
2. The second type of selection bias could arise because programs choose where to locate
their activities--villages are not picked at random. Since program directors are
understandably concerned with making their programs successful, it is possible that the
villages chosen are the ones that are already doing relatively well, have better access to
markets and roads, are more liberal in their attitudes towards women's work, or have a
reputation for self-employment. Comparing such villages with control villages which
could, for example, be economically worse off or are inherently more conservative, would
give more credit to the programs for positive results than they necessarily deserve.
One way to avoid the first type of selection bias is to compare participants with a target
group from control villages that do not have a credit program, as opposed to comparing
participants with non-participants in the same villages. A random group from villages
without credit programs would have a higher probability of being more representative of the
general population than non-participants from program villages. However, this does not
mitigate against the second type of selection bias (that location of programs is non-random)
as it is extremely difficult to find control villages that are exactly similar to program villages in
all respects. In this type of a comparison, village level differences might account more for
differences in results from the comparison than the impact of the credit program per se.
Although not a selection bias problem, an additional confounding factor when comparing
participants with non-participants in credit programs is the possibility of spillover effects
within a village. Credit to participants might create employment opportunities for non-
participants (a woman who uses her loan to buy chickens might pay another woman to help
her feed and look after them); increased mobility and assertiveness in women participants
might encourage non-participants to behave likewise. Therefore, if differences between
participants and non-participants are not significant, this might actually underestimate the
impact of the credit program.
There are also likely to be response bias problems depending on who is actually carrying out
evaluations. Because credit is such a scarce commodity in most villages, members are happy
merely having access to this money, and might be unwilling to jeopardize their positions by
speaking negatively about its impact when speaking with evaluators who might be connected
to the organization.
There are thus numerous problems with carrying out impact evaluations of credit programs.
Cross-sectional surveys carried out by the lending organizations are not the best method.
What is needed are time-series analyses, carefully trying to eliminate random changes,
controlling for differences within communities (where there might be spillover effects) and
between communities, to eliminate some of the selection biases. It is interesting that there
has not been one time-series analysis to date of either Grameen's or BRAC's credit programs.
Since all the evaluations examined in this study are based on cross-section data, the
limitations outlined above need to be kept in mind when considering the results as they are
likely to have a consistent positive bias.
II. Impact on Women's Employment
Where evaluations have tried to specifically measure women's employment, they have all
concluded that this value has increased as a result of credit. R. Rahman's 1986 study and
Hossain's 1988 study, both on the Grameen Bank, show that women participants work more
hours than non-participants (neither study corrects for selection bias, and are thus likely to
be positively biased). While this may be true of the Grameen Bank, the results are a little
more fuzzy when we compare other credit programs as well. The following is a detailed
analysis of a recent (1995) study of credit's impact on women's employment. The reason I
have gone into detail here is to show how evaluators are sometimes tempted to generalize
results across the board, even when the data proves otherwise.
The World Bank and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) has carried out
one of the most extensive impact evaluations of credit programs. The study surveys 1,798
households (4,715 individuals) from three programs: the Grameen Bank, BRAC and BRDB
(the Bangladesh Rural Development Board, the government's equivalent to these programs).
Rahman and Khandker (1995) examine specifically the role of targeted credit programs in
promoting employment. They define the target group as individuals eligible for credit, i.e.
landless and assetless families as defined in Chapter 2. They compare participants with non-
participants, also from the target group, from the same villages as well as with the target
group in control villages without any credit programs.10 As their dependent variables, they
measure labour force participation rates and the number of labour hours worked per month
by both men and women in the three programs. Table 4 shows their results for women's
employment.
Table 4
Impact of Credit Programs on Women's Employment
Labor force Employment: Labour hours per month
participation Self Wage Total
rate Employment Employment Employment
Grameen participants 68.3 49.9 14.7 64.7
Grameen non-participants 55 31.8 34.1 65.9
BRAC participants 51.2 23.8 22.5 46.2
BRAC non-participants 42.9 27.4 16.9 44.3
BRDB participants 64.5 35.8 9.7 45.5
BRDB non-participants 56.5 46.7 23.4 70.2
Avg for all participants * 61.3 36.5 15.6 52.1
Control village: Target group 63 24.5 32 56.4
* Own estimates assuming equal numbers in each program
Source: Rahman and Khandker 1995
10 They have an additional category, non-target households, which are households that are not eligible for
credit, i.e. they own more than half an acre of land and their assets are worth more than one acre of land. Since
this category is not relevant for my analysis, I do not cite results for it here. Of a total of 1,798 households
surveyed, 1,538 were eligible for credit (i.e. target households). Of these, 905 (60%) were participants in the
credit programs.
Using these data, Rahman and Khandker show that: (a) women participants of Grameen and
BRDB have a higher labour force participation rate compared to the target group in control
villages; (b) women participants of Grameen work longer hours compared to the target group
in control villages; (c) in BRAC and BRDB, participants' monthly working hours are
"comparable" to the control areas; and (d) employment per worker is higher in program
villages than in control villages for both male and female workers (ibid.: pp. 8-9). Based on
these simple comparisons, they conclude this section of the paper by saying:
The above analysis shows that the credit programs have been successful in expanding
self-employment opportunities. Labor force participation rates among women have
increased. Participation rates and employment per worker are higher among program
participants than among the target group population in the control area. This reflects the
enhanced overall level of employment as well as self-employment in the program villages.
(Rahman and Khandker 1995, p. 21)
A closer look at the actual figures, however, shows that the evidence the authors use for their
conclusions is rather selective. Looking at labour force participation rates 11, if we take the
control villages as our basis for comparison (a rate of 63%), we can see that Grameen and
BRDB participants do participate more than the control group (68.3% and 64.5%
respectively) but that the differences are not large. We also see that BRAC participants
participate far less (51.2%). Since the authors do not propose an explanation for BRAC's
low figure, it is inaccurate to conclude unequivocally that credit programs increase women's
labour force participation rates. 12 What would have been a more honest approach might have
been to aggregate the results for the different programs and give an average across the entire
sample. In the last row of Table 4, I have calculated simple averages for all women
participants (I have assumed an equal distribution of women participants among the three
programs as the number of members by program are not given). This shows that differences
between rates for program participants and the control group are negligible (61.3% compared
to 63% respectively) and almost certainly not statistically significant.
With regard to the number of hours worked per month (hereafter, working hours), a number
of issues arise. 13 The authors show that Grameen Bank participants work longer hours than
11 They do not explain how they calculate the labour force participation rate.
12 Without explaining the BRAC figures, the only way their conclusion might have been justified is if their
sample size for BRAC was very small, making its effect statistically insignificant. However, the paper by Pitt
and Khandker which contains selected details of the entire sample, implies that there are actually more
respondents from BRAC than from Grameen or BRDB (Pitt and Khandker 1994, p. 29).
13 Estimates of numbers of hours worked are first extremely unreliable as they depend completely on participant
recall. This is specially problematic for measuring labour hours in self-employment activities which are often
the control group (64.7 working hours compared to 56.4), and state that working hours for
BRAC and BRDB participants are "comparable" to the control group figures. From their
statements, it is unclear which figures they are comparing since the results are diaggregated
according to self-employment, wage employment and total employment. The total
employment figures show that participants in both BRAC (46.2 hours) and BRDB (45.5
hours) actually workfewer hours than the control group (56.4 hours).' 4
According to the self-employment figures Grameen participants work almost twice as much
as the control group (49.9 hours compared to 24.5), BRDB participants also work more (35.8
hours), and BRAC participants work about as much (23.8 hours). The average across
participants, 36.5 hours, is much higher than the 24.5 hours for the control group. Although
these figures are consistent with the authors' conclusions, when we compare program
participants with non-participants in the same villages, the results are quite different.
Although Grameen participants work approximately 8 hours more per month than non-
participants in Grameen villages, in BRAC and BRDB, participants actually work less than
non-participants.
I have mentioned above the danger of comparing participants with non-participants because
of selection bias and possible spillover effects. One expects, nevertheless, that participants
will work more than non-participants--if there is indeed a selection bias, it is merely the
absolute difference between working hours for participants and non-participants that would
be affected. The fact that the figures for BRAC and BRDB imply that women who take
loans work less in self-employment activities than women who do not is a surprising
outcome that the authors do not address.
In reexamining the data, it is clear that the evidence from Rahman and Khandker's study does
not show that women's employment has unequivocally or significantly increased as a result of
credit. At best, their figures show that the Grameen Bank is better at creating employment
opportunities than BRAC and BRDB. Yet, the authors conclude that credit programs have
"enhanced [the] overall level of employment as well as self-employment in the program
combined with regular household duties. For example, a woman who might be boiling rice in preparation for
dehusking (a self-employment activity) at the same time and on the same stove as she used to cook, might not
count that time towards "labour".
14 It is even more interesting that in another paper based on the same survey, and co-authored by Khandker also
(Pitt and Khandker 1994), they state that employment hours per month for all women in the study (granted, not
just women who took loans) is 40 for participants, 37 for non-participants, and 44 for women in the control
areas, again indicating the women who have not benefited at all from credit programs work more hours than
ones who have.
villages" (p. 21). Given that this particular survey is one of the most extensive ones carried
out to date of credit programs, and that it is sponsored by two organizations (the World Bank
and BIDS) that are well respected authorities in the field, it is likely that the conclusions
stated above will be taken at face value and used to show the undeniable contribution of credit
towards creating employment opportunities for women and therefore strengthening women's
economic roles and positions in the household.
III. Impact on Women's Income
The recent World Bank-BIDS study does not try to measure the impact of credit on incomes.
However, Pitt and Khandker (1994) infer that, since women's labor supply increases due to
credit, they must be earning more cash incomes. These results are used to show that women
are becoming more "empowered", and that "women are the major beneficiaries of targeted
credit programs in the true sense" (Pitt and Khandker 1994, p. 47). There is no mention in
their study that women might never see these "incomes" since they rarely go to the market to
sell the products that their labour produces.
A review of research on the Grameen Bank carried out from 1986-1992 identifies four studies
that have looked at the impact on incomes (Chen 1992). One of the studies indicates that
household income among participants is greater than that for non-participants (in control
villages) by as much as 43 percent (ibid, p. 4). Another showed that participants' household
incomes had increased by 53 percent over three years. However, these are household income
figures. The only study that looked specifically at women's incomes was by R. Rahman
(1986). She shows that Grameen Bank women contribute significantly to their household
incomes from their loan activities--providing about 38% of total income earned by the average
household. However, Rahman herself cautions that "though these activities are organized
mainly by the female loanee and mainly with the finance provided by the [Grameen Bank],
this often emerges as a family activity where families' resources are also pooled and other
members contribute labour input to this activity" (p. 49). Rahman justifies calling this the
"woman's" income because it was her catalytic role as a Grameen member that made the
endeavour possible.
IV. Remarks
A number of issues are evident from this review.
1. Doing impact evaluations of credit programs is not an easy task, even when trying to
measure "quantifiable" variables like incomes and employment.
2. There is obviously a dearth of studies that try to measure the economic impact of credit
on women. This is perhaps the result of an expectation that credit will/should benefit the
household, not the woman, or that strengthening women's economic positions will
happen automatically if credit is provided to them.
3. The Grameen Bank seems to have succeeded in improving women's employment and
incomes. Other programs have not fared as well.
Defenders of credit programs would argue that even if women's incomes and employment
have not increased, these programs have other features that seek to change women's lives and
empower them. And studies do exist that look at women's empowerment. These form the
subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE
Whither Empowerment?
I. Defining Empowerment
Empowerment is a value laden and contentious term, defined, measured and used in different
ways by different groups in society for different purposes. It is rarely precisely defined,
even by organizations that have empowerment (of the poor, or of women, or of the
oppressed) as their overriding goal. For example, BRAC describes itself as an organization
whose two major goals are poverty alleviation and empowerment of the poor (BRAC Annual
Report 1993). Yet, it is difficult to find anywhere BRAC's working definition of the concept.
BRAC seems to use a number of definitions which include:
people gaining an understanding of and control over social, economic, and/or political
forces in order to improve their standing in society; or
a social action process that promotes participation of people, organisations, and
communities in gaining control over their lives in their community and larger society; or
specifically about women
the capacity of women to be economically self-sufficient and self-reliant with control over
decisions affecting their life options and freedom from violence 15
Each of these definitions contain common themes of improving lives, of control over
resources and participation in decision-making spheres. Ultimately, however, "to empower"
means "to make more powerful". The question is then, to make more powerful in relation to
what? If we claim to "empower" women, are we trying to make them more powerful relative
to their husbands, their children, their in-laws, the rich, conniving politicians, fundamentalist
religious leaders? Is it enough to become more powerful in one sphere and not in others? Or
does empowerment mean just becoming more powerful in relation to their previously
disempowered state? And in that case, is this empowerment or does it signify merely a
betterment in women's lives?
Lukes (1974) provides a useful theoretical discussion of the different interpretations of
power in the social sciences. He distinguishes between three: the "power to", the "power
over" and the "power within". The "power to" is concerned with decision-making and is
15 From "Annotation of the Literature on the Empowerment of the Poor" by F. Karim, A. Mahbub, and M.
Mannan, 1993, as cited in Huda and Hossain (1994) p. 10
defined as the capacity of people to influence outcomes against the wishes of others. In the
context of credit programs, giving a woman control over financial resources is expected to give
her the power to decide, for example, to spend money on her daughter's education even if her
husband objects. The "power over" is a broader concept that recognizes that certain issues
are excluded from the decision-making agenda, so that they are not considered "decisionable".
For example, a woman might have the power to make decisions about expenditures, but what
is usually never negotiated is the man's control over household land, capital and other assets.
The "power within", a term and concept used in the feminist literature, points out that not
only are some issues removed from the decision-making agenda, others are suppressed from
the consciousness of the parties involved. "Power relations are kept in place because the
actors involved--both dominant and subordinate--subscribe to accounts of social reality which
deny that ... inequalities exist" (Kabeer 1994, p. 227). This can be illustrated by some
women's response when I asked them what they did with their loans. They said they gave
the loan to their husbands because the husbands were unemployed. The concept that a
woman could work when her husband did not, had not occurred to them.
11. Measuring Empowerment
There are thus various dimensions to power. Organizations that aim to "empower" women
choose to tackle different dimensions of power. Since these are not always precisely
articulated or defined, it is also very difficult to measure the impact that these organizations'
efforts have had on empowerment.
I described in Chapter Two that the Grameen Bank and BRAC have designed their credit
programs in ways that are expected to empower women in more than just an economic sense.
Hashemi and Schuler (1993) sketch a general picture of the transformation that is expected to
occur in women's lives as a result of their participation in these credit programs.
At an individual level, participation in group meetings, and explicit efforts by the credit
organizations to make women speak up and articulate their concerns, look people in the
eye and not feel intimidated in the presence of a man or a stranger will make women more
assertive and self-confident. Mandatory weekly meetings, requiring women to be
physically present at branch offices to collect loans, and the economic activities they
engage in through the loans will increase women's mobility, and consequently reduce the
"invisibility" of women in the public sphere. Credit gives women the opportunity to earn
cash incomes, and their enhanced contribution to family incomes will strengthen their
bargaining position within the household. This enhanced economic role, combined with
their increased assertiveness will make them better able to make independent decisions
and play a more decisive role in joint decisions. Interaction with their respective centers
and officials of the lending organizations will give women exposure to the world outside
their homesteads. Combined with the organizations' efforts to increase their legal and
political awareness, it is expected that over time, women will learn to effectively seek out
services and resources in the public sphere that was restricted to them previously because
of their isolation and subordination. Through credit programs, therefore, women are
expected to gain in status, be listened to more often and respected, and have greater
decision making power--women will become empowered.
Based on this picture of how these programs empower women, Hashemi and Schuler
identify six general domains in which subordination of women in rural Bangladesh is
traditionally played out, and in which empowerment is believed to be taking place as a
result of participation in credit programs:
1. Sense of self and vision of a future
2. Mobility and visibility
3. Status and decision-making power within the household
4. Economic security
5. Ability to interact effectively in the public sphere
6. Participation in non-family groups (e.g. collective enterprises)
A number of indicators are used to measure each of these domains. To give a few examples,
in a society where attire, conduct, and attitudes of women are carefully regulated to ensure
their subordination to men, seemingly simple actions such as not leaving the road when a man
appears, not hiding behind her sari, looking people in the eye rather than looking down, can
be observed by interviewers, and give an indication of a sense of self. Mobility and visibility
can be measured by asking questions like whether women go to meetings, the bank, training
sessions, the cinema, etc. Highest points are usually given to women who break tradition
most, i.e. go to the market place or go to the cinema. Some of the indicators that can be used
to measure decision-making power are a woman's ability to use money, spend money and
make purchases on her own, as well as her influence over major decisions like buying a cow,
leasing land, etc.
The six domains identified by Hashemi and Schuler to measure empowerment encompass the
spectrum of indicators commonly used by standard evaluations. All of them are difficult to
measure. The most popular indicator is influence over household decisions. If, after joining
credit programs, women are observed to be participating more decisively and with more
authority in household decisions (like purchasing food and clothing, investments like buying a
cow or land or repairing the house, marrying off a son or daughter, etc.), these women are
considered to be empowered.
There are, however, a number of problems with using influence over specific decisions within
the household as an indicator of empowerment. One is the accuracy of the data one can
expect to get when asking sensitive questions about who decides what in the household.
Since decisions in the household are normally a result of discussion, compromise or
persuasion, people might respond according to their perception of who had the final say in a
decision, as opposed to what happened in reality. For example, a farmer might decide to buy
a cow, but do so as a result of listening to his wife talk constantly of how beneficial it would
be for the household to own one. An evaluator asking the man about who made the decision
would most probably hear "I did".
The second problem is the fact that power is not manifested in one issue but rather a range of
issues. The question lies in how the importance of issues is determined (Lukes 1986). In
gathering data on decisions, it is the evaluators who decide what the "key" decisions are. Key
decisions might well vary from household to household. For example, the decision to visit
relatives living in another village, an indicator used in one study, might be an important factor
in a conservative village, and might be of little consequence in a more liberal village where
women have relatively more mobility to begin with. In addition, an individual may have more
power in some areas and less in others, making it difficult for evaluators to weigh the
variables accurately. Thus, a woman who plays a strong role in deciding whether the
household should invest in a cow might, at the same time, have little say in who her son or
daughter should marry. Is this woman less or more empowered than the one who decides on
her children's marriages but has no influence over investment decisions?
To complicate things further, there is also the problem that a woman may be allowed to make
decisions about certain issues only to the extent that the range of choices she considers are
narrow and acceptable. Thus, a man might give his wife full responsibility of all household
expenditures assuming that her priority is the welfare of her children, her husband and her in-
laws. If she should want to spend money on her own parents or just on herself, she might
not be allowed to do so. In Lukes' terms, this would be called the lack of the "power over".
The other indicators of empowerment have received similar criticisms. Huda and Hossain
(1994) raise an interesting and valid objection to another commonly used indicator, increased
mobility/visibility of women. They say that if we are to use this indicator alone, without any
conditions, we might well find that the most empowered woman will be the itinerant beggar,
obviously not a result that is compatible with any definition of empowerment.
III. Studies on Empowerment
Imperfect as they are, these are the indicators that have been used most commonly to
measure the impact of credit on women's empowerment. The results of the principal studies
are presented below.
As I mention earlier, household decision-making is the most commonly used indicator. R.
Rahman (1986), studying the impact of the Grameen bank on women, tested whether women
were mainly or jointly responsible for decisions in five areas of family decision-making: (a)
daily purchases of food; (b) purchases of clothing; (c) type of medical treatment; (d) travel to
relatives' house; and (e) marriage of son or daughter. Rahman concludes that while the pattern
of influence is not very clear from the data, wives of male loanees seem to exercise the least
influence over decisions, "transfer-making" women (women who hand their entire loans over
to male members) exercise a higher level of decision-making, and active female loanees exercise
the highest level. Table 5 shows these results. Putting aside the questions of reliability in
using decision-making data as a measure of power, what Rahman fails to point out is that the
most relevant comparison group, the target group in the control villages, seem to perform
better than even the active female loanees in three of the five areas, making even her tentative
conclusion largely irrelevant.
Although not classified as "decisions", Rahman also investigates consumption and
expenditure patterns in Grameen households, and concludes that female loanees on the whole
consume more meals per day and spend more money on clothing (saris) than either wives of
male loanees or non-participants. Although the reference period for her questions was rather
short (for consumption, it was number of meals taken the day before the interview and
average over the last week; for expenditure it was number of saris bought in the last year,
Table 5
Influence of Grameen Bank Women on Household Decision-Making
Percentage offamilies where decisions are taken mainly by the woman orjointly
by the husband and wife
Daily Purchases of Type of Travel to Marriage of
Group purchase of clothing medical relatives' son or
food treatment houses daughter
Active 72.9 45.1 66.2 69.2 78.0
Loanees
Transfer- 72.3 39.0 83.3 55.6 94.4
making
Loanees
Wives of 59.4 8.1 37.8 27.0 71.5
Male Loanees
Control 94.4 31.6 38.9 88.9 86.8
Group
Non- 74.0 31.7 55.6 61.8 75.8
participants
Source: R. Rahman 1986, p. 69
which ranged between one and two, making it difficult to detect differences), and though the
differences between the groups were small, she shows that even those female loanees who
passed their entire loans on to their husbands spent more on themselves than the wives of
male loanees, concluding that "even such a passive loan improves the situation of a woman in
the family" (p. 60).16 Rahman's results were not adjusted for income levels. Since
expenditure is a function of income, and credit seems to lead to increased household incomes,
and since the differences between the groups are minimal, it is difficult to conclude from her
study that women in Grameen households, transfer-making ones or not, are better off than
those who did not take loans.
Another study has also attempted to measure empowerment through household decision-
making processes. Where Rahman looked at the impact of credit on decision-making, Mizan
(1994), looked at factors which affect household decisions using credit as one of the
16 Pitt and Khandker (1994) in their study of Grameen, BRAC and BRDB, have also looked at expenditure
patterns, and although they do not look at the impact of credit on women specifically, they find that giving
loans to women is more likely to increase household expenditure on food items than giving loans to men.
They also find that loaning to women increases the probability of girls being sent to school by a factor of 0.034.
Both of these results, which correct for sample selection bias, were found to be statistically significant.
independent variables 17 . The most important limitation to Mizan's study is that she too
does not correct for selection bias. Her analysis is based on 200 participants and non-
participants, with no control from villages that do not have credit programs. Nevertheless, in
the absence of other studies that investigate empowerment issues, her results are presented
briefly.
Using simple regression analysis, Mizan finds that the three most important variables
determining household decision-making are, in order of importance, the age of the woman, the
length of her participation in the program, and income from the Grameen Bank. While the
results on age are expected in traditional Bangladeshi society which bestows greater respect
and authority on older people, it is interesting that length of participation has a stronger
impact on empowerment than income. It suggests that women are gaining resources other
than income from credit programs that are enabling them to have a greater say in household
decisions. Mizan explains this finding by saying that longer involvement in credit programs
gives women more exposure to the outside world, enhances expressive verbal and negotiating
skills, strengthens social network affiliations and knowledge, all of which can be applied in
decision-making situations at home. These crucial resources of competence, confidence and
motivation are, she says, more effective inducers of power within the household than a
strengthened economic role. 18
Schuler and Hashemi (1994) carry out perhaps the most sophisticated analysis of
empowerment. As outlined earlier, they try to measure empowerment through all six
domains in their study. They compile the responses to questions from the six domains to
formulate an aggregate empowerment indicator for each individual in their sample of 1,305
women. Doing their analysis on both Grameen and BRAC members (using non-participants
and a group from villages without any programs as controls), they show that (1) the presence
of a credit program in a village has a significant positive effect on women's level of
empowerment (controlling for age, schooling and wealth); (2) participation in credit programs
strengthens women's economic roles within the family, where economic role is measured by
level of contribution to family's support; and (3) both participation in credit programs and
17 Along with decisions regarding food, clothing, and medical treatment, she includes major decisions
including buying a cow, leasing land, and hiring workers.
18 The other significant variables affecting decision-making included fertility and the parent's residential
location, fertility being a burden for women, heightening her dependency, and the closer physical presence of her
parents increasing her power.
contribution to family support have a significant positive effect on empowerment.19 The
authors conclude that the positive impact of credit on women's level of empowerment seems
attributable, in part, to its effectiveness in strengthening women's economic roles through
credit.
As I mention in the previous section, Schuler and Hashemi's indicators of empowerment have
been questioned by some. In addition, I would add a word of caution regarding the variable
they use to measure "economic roles". The authors evaluate economic role according to
women's contribution to family support. They measure contribution by giving a score of 1 to
women who said their contribution to family support represented "all of it", "most of it",
"half of it" or "some of it", and a score of 0 to those who said they contributed "a very small
portion" or "none of it". Using such a simple classification to measure economic roles is
almost equivalent to asking "do you take out a loan". To put things in perspective, the
landless/assetless people who are members of credit programs earn less than Taka 8,000
(which is per capita GNP) per year. The average size of loans for women, even in 1985, was
Taka 4,000. Under these circumstances, I would think that any loanee will say they
contribute "something" to family support if they bring this much money into the household.
Therefore, according to Schuler and Hashemi's classifications, almost any woman who takes
out a loan will consider herself to have "strengthened her economic role in the household",
regardless of whether she contributes to family support with a regular income from her own
economic activities.
Although Schuler and Hashemi conclude that a strengthened economic role leads to women's
empowerment, they are careful to emphasize that strong economic positions seem to explain
empowerment only in part. There are other ways that participation in credit programs
empowers women. These are reflected in the ways in which the credit programs are
organized, including their emphasis on bringing women out of the homestead into group
meetings, forming a group identity, allowing for interaction with outsiders, etc., as described
earlier.
19 One of the principal hypothesis the authors were testing was that participation in credit programs or
residence in communities where such programs exist increases the likelihood that a woman will use
contraceptives. Although they do not use "contraceptive use" as an indicator of empowerment, they do show
through their analysis that the Grameen Bank has a strong positive effect on contraceptive use. Surprisingly,
BRAC membership does not seem to affect contraceptive use.
CHAPTER SIX
Maximizing Credit's Impact on Women
In the two previous chapters, I discuss the ways in which evaluations have generally studied
the impact of credit on women. Chapter Four showed that studies measuring income and
employment effects have sometimes presented biased results or used selective evidence to
prove that credit has had a positive impact on both. While the results of the latest study
combining data from three of the largest credit programs in Bangladesh provide inconclusive
evidence on whether incomes and employment of women have indeed gone up, other studies,
especially those exclusively on the Grameen Bank, show that these have increased. However,
evidence of male appropriation of women's loans makes it clear that data on income and
employment do not necessarily prove that women gain more control over economic
resources.
Some of the studies on empowerment that are reviewed in Chapter Five have had a similar
positive bias. A more fundamental problem with the studies on empowerment have been the
ways evaluators define and measure empowerment. Not only has the definition of the term
been elusive, the indicators used to measure it (household decision-making, increased
mobility) do not necessarily capture the changes that might or might not be occurring in
women's lives. The feminist critique of credit programs, presented by Goetz and Sen Gupta,
postulates that the only way women are really going to be empowered is if they retain
control over their loans and participate in the financial aspects of their loan-financed activity.
This poses a dilemma for the organizations that provide credit to women with a view to
empowering them. The most recent impact assessment of BRAC's credit program carried out
by its Research and Evaluation Division (Mustafa et al 1995) reflects this clearly. This study
shows that although BRAC has brought about positive changes in women's lives, in a
majority of cases, it is still the male members of the households who utilize the loans received
by female members. This fact leads the evaluators to question the long term goals of BRAC's
credit program. In their conclusion, they ask:
Should BRAC go on expanding its women's credit programme without creating an
enabling environment which allows them to use loans themselves?... To effect significant
change in women's lives, women targeted programmes are not likely to give the best
results. (Mustafa et al 1995, p. 37)
I. The Difficulties of Controlling Loan Use
Ensuring that women use their own loans is no easy task. Some of the problems and
difficulties are laid out below.
a. Institutional constraints
I identified in Chapter Three some of the institutional reasons that men tend to take over
women's loans, namely the problem of unemployment/underemployment; the general lack of
access to commercial credit; low productivity of women's work; and their lack of access to
the market. Until these problems, which are external to the organizations, are addressed
directly through government policy, it is unlikely that there will be a quick reversal of this
situation. Although Grameen and BRAC have both attempted to create an enabling
environment for women to use loans (BRAC through its sub-sector strategy and Grameen
through its policy of loaning for women's activities only), these have faced some problems.
b. "Women's" activities
For BRAC, the sub-sector programs have proved to be a great challenge. Management of an
entire production process as well as marketing of products requires specific skills on the part
of the staff, as well as additional time and resources. Managing a business successfully in a
capitalistic sense (i.e. for profit) is difficult enough. When empowerment is added to this
goal, there has to be a tradeoff. A recent study examining BRAC's sericulture program
highlights some of the management problems that the organization has faced (Harvard
Business School 1994).
My fieldwork revealed additional problems. Interviews with some BRAC loanees
demonstrated that sometimes, if a particular woman's income generating project starts to do
really well, the man will quit his current occupation and join his wife in her project. This
happened a number of times with poultry and sericulture projects. As these women's
projects grew, and they started to take out loans to build huts for their growing numbers of
chicks or silkworms, the man realized that this was a lucrative business, and decided to give
up his not-as-lucrative day labour or rickshaw pulling job. Where both husband and wife
were involved in the same activity, it was invariably the husband who took over the financial
aspects because of cultural norms. Thus, ensuring that women are involved in a profitable
activity might actually increase the probability of male appropriation. Similar observations
of men joining the woman's activity were made with some of the non-traditional activities
BRAC encourages women to become involved in, like the restaurant business (Khan 1993).
Grameen faces similar problems of identifying what exactly a woman's activity is. The
following case illustrates this:
Nirada Rani, a center leader whose husband is a fisherman, borrowed money from
Grameen to make fishing nets--traditionally a woman's activity. That year, the family
did so well that they decided they would need bigger nets the next year. The size and
quality of net they wanted, however, could not be made at home. Thus the following
year, she took out a loan for a fishing net, only this time, instead of making the net, she
gave the money to her husband to go and buy it. The family's fishing business has grown
immensely over the last eight years, but Nirada Rani no longer deals with any of the
financial aspects of the business. She takes annual loans from Grameen for their
investments and repairs to the fishnets, but lets her husband handle the money. She says
she spends all her time looking after her children, sending them to school, helping them do
their homework (she is literate). Has the fact that she does not use the loan directly made
her any less valuable in her husband's eyes or in society's eyes? She does not think so.
She smiles when she says that the only way the household was able to get the money in
the first place is because of her, and that it does not matter who is using it.
Thus, what constitutes a "woman's" activity is not as clear cut as we think, even in
Bangladesh where tradition has such a strong hand in determining gender roles.
c. Organizational limitations
White (1991) raises an important issue of whether organizations should be trying to control
women's use of loans. Reviewing six credit programs, White observes: "Loans and profits
from businesses are usually split and used in variety of different ways. The household in
which funds enter is a joint venture with both economic and social dimensions, in which
different individuals have access to 'common' resources, and in which sums for different
purposes are highly fungible" (Section 6.1.3). Thus, women may take a loan for a certain
activity but in emergency situations, might use it for other needs. Although investing in non-
productive activities is technically not permitted, one of the women I interviewed gave the
loan to her father who had lost his home in a flood, another used it for her son's circumcision
ceremony, another gave it to her husband to salvage a deteriorating marital relationship,
another bought medicine for an illness, etc. When asked how they repaid these loans, they
were a little evasive, saying either through their husband's earnings or that they "managed"
through sales of homegrown vegetables, eggs, etc. These women's ability to use loans for
other purposes were critical survival techniques for the family. Controlling what women use
this money for would take away the maneuvering capacity that credit currently provides in
their lives.
II. The Mechanisms by Which Credit Influences Women
A preoccupation with ensuring women use their own loans is based on the way we have
presumed credit works to empower women, i.e. that giving loans to women makes them
income earners, strengthens their economic positions in the household and therefore
empowers them. This relationship can be depicted in the following manner:
Figure One
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Grameen and BRAC provide additional inputs through the structure of the programs and
through their consciousness raising efforts. These are expected to transform women's lives as
described earlier (p. 37). Based on this, we can modify Figure One in the following way:
Figure Two
Credit to
woman
Consciousness
raising aciiis
Training and
skills
Woman invests
in productive
activity
Woman is
empowered
/1//
Where women have invested their loans in profitable activities that they have managed and
controlled, credit, combined with consciousness raising activities and the training and skills
provided by these organizations, has indeed succeeded in fundamentally changing their lives,
their economic positions in the household, their husbands' attitudes towards them, and the
way society views them. These are the many "success story cases" of Grameen and BRAC.
A number of studies give powerful anecdotal evidence of individual women whose lives have
changed dramatically thanks to these programs (see for example, Jorimon and Others: Faces
of Poverty, edited by Mohammad Yunus).
Even without bringing in the issue of male appropriation, my fieldwork revealed that even
where women are becoming income earners, their positions in the household do not improve
unequivocally. Two of the BRAC loanees I spoke with mentioned that their husbands are
actually less appreciative of them since they joined BRAC. Where before these men had
control over all finances, and could express their fondness of their families by buying
necessities or gifts at their discretion, they now feel differently. Now, these women have to
ask their husbands for things, and sometimes the men's response is "Why are you asking me?
You have your own money, get it yourself." Marital relationships thus do not always
improve with effective use of credit.
Some BRAC women also stated that although they were earning their own incomes, they
would nevertheless hand over their earnings to their husbands. Their general attitude is "We
are a family. We work together for our betterment." Sofura, who has been trained in rearing
chickens through BRAC's poultry program, says that if she did not give her husband her
money, he would tell her to go and live on her own with her own money. Khodeja, who has
been quite successful in the sericulture program, says that she "makes" her husband control
the money. She is very clear about her reasons: she deliberately does not want to be
completely responsible for the loan and gives him control so that "the whole risk wont be
[hers] alone".
Goetz and Sen Gupta also raise the possibility that as women are more effectively targeted
for credit, and as sources of institutional credit for men decline (as discussed in Chapter
Three), this might lead to the increased commodification of women, where their value is
measured by their success in gaining and retaining membership in these programs. The
authors quote a field worker heard saying that credit is actually becoming just another form of
dowry (1995, p. 20).
Where men are using women's loans, a number of scenarios could take place. Some of the
possible negative consequences (e.g. women suffering violence when they have to beg their
husbands for weekly repayments) were mentioned in Chapter One. Ackerly (1995) uses
Goetz and Sen Gupta's analysis to classify some other possible scenarios. Men who take
over women's loans could: (1) give over all their earnings (including earnings from their own
work) to the woman, leaving her to manage all household finances; (2) give only the required
weekly payments to their wives; (3) give some earnings but the woman has to supplement
these with her own sources ("mushti chal", etc. as in p. 8) to make the full payment; or (4) he
could refuse to give the weekly payments making the woman plead with him for the money
or resort to other sources which most likely will exact a higher cost.
All these scenarios demonstrate that credit might not always have an empowering effect on
women as conventional wisdom (as depicted in Figure Two) supposes. Figure Three
incorporates the scenarios described above.
From Figure Three, it is difficult to know in which of the cases women are being empowered,
since even where they invest the money themselves, they might still lose control over their
earnings. Figure Three shows the fallacies in presuming (1) that controlling financial
resources leads directly to empowerment; and (2) that credit increases women's control over
financial resources.
All the evaluation studies that have looked at empowerment issues have highlighted the
critical role that the design of Grameen style programs and efforts at conscientization have
played in influencing women's lives. The design of the programs emphasizes group
solidarity, depending on and supporting one another, bringing women out of the homestead
and in contact with the outside world, taking on leadership roles and making women interact
with officials and professionals. The consciousness raising efforts, described by Grameen's
Sixteen Decisions and BRAC's Seventeen Promises (Chapter Two), have some conventional
development goals (health, water and sanitation, family planning, education, etc.), but also
emphasize some of the more intangible aspects of social development--discipline, unity,
responsibility, courage, justice and solidarity. There is also the decision not to give or take
dowry, one of the main institutionalized expressions of women's subordination. New forms
of consciousness arise out of women's newly acquired resources of analytical skills, social
networks, solidarity, self confidence and self esteem.
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III. An Alternative Way of Looking at Empowerment
As Ackerly (1995) points out, although it is commonly presumed to be, credit itself is not
empowering--by definition, it is actually a liability. In order for this liability to be
empowering, it must be seen as a means, not as a goal. Ackerly argues that when a borrower
invests her loan in a successful enterprise, she develops knowledge--knowledge about an
economic activity, about prices of inputs and outputs, about profitability, etc.--and it is this
knowledge that gains her the respect of her husband and her society, and therefore empowers
her. The author shows that involvement in the buying and selling of goods from the loan-
financed activity, as opposed to merely providing labour, is more likely to increase a woman's
knowledge. She concludes that in order to empower borrowers, credit programmes should
focus their efforts on increased market activity. I show earlier in the paper the constraints to
ensuring loan use by women. I do not wish to imply by this, however, that organizations
should abandon all efforts to enable women to invest in activities that they are in charge of.
Both Grameen and BRAC should be commended on the strategies they have developed to
achieve this--traditional activities and subsector programs. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to recommend one strategy over the other. Unfortunately, both have their own set of
limitations.
Even if men are going to be taking over some loans targeted for women, knowledge can play
an important part in ensuring that women gain some benefits. Even when a woman does not
go to the market, if she knows about costs, market prices, profits, she is in a better position
to hold her husband accountable to her for the money. This learning process can be
encouraged by making it one of the criteria by which success is measured. Just as evaluators
ask about employment, incomes, and household decision making, knowledge would give an
idea of the woman's level of awareness of financial matters and of the market.
If knowledge is made a standard criteria by which to measure empowerment, organizations
would in turn be pressured to find creative ways of ensuring that women gain this knowledge,
whether this is through direct involvement in the loan-financed activity or through
communication with their husbands and others. Ackerly (1995) cites examples of two NGOs
in Bangladesh, the Shakti Foundation and Save the Children Fund (SCF), who give great value
to market knowledge of their borrowers. Shakti has formalized this by making loan approval
subject to the husband's sharing market information with his wife and her being able to
demonstrate her knowledge before the loan is issued. SCF has a more informal mechanism,
whereby during weekly meetings, borrowers are strongly and repeatedly encouraged to seek
market knowledge. Goetz and Sen Gupta (1994) describe another NGO, TMSS (Thengemara
Mahila Sebuj Sangstha), which also requires women borrowers to provide accurate and
continuous accounts of loan use, as well as encouraging informal contracts between women
and male users if women are not the primary users.
Focusing strictly on knowledge of the market, however, reduces the concept of empowerment
to the first one articulated by Lukes--the "power to". It disregards other forms of
empowerment, the "power over" and the "power within". The way these programs are
designed and the consciousness raising activities of the two organizations address some
aspects of these domains of power. The knowledge indicator can be used to measure the
success of these activities as well. Knowledge over issues such as women's human and legal
rights can be tested--especially critical issues such as inheritance laws and divorce laws.
Much of women's insecurity stems from ignorance of laws. Men are thus able to get away
with divorcing their wives at a moment's notice 20 without paying alimony, sons claim all the
family property even when by law daughters have a right to at least one third of assets. Of
course, many of these existing institutions are still unequal and favor men over women (why
should daughters get one third of assets instead of half?), and they need to be changed. Some
credit organizations have taken on this task directly. For example, the Self Employed
Women's Association (SEWA) in India emphasizes the rights and interests of self-employed
women workers to a trade union of their own. Intangible as they may seem, consciousness
raising efforts of these programs are critical factors in ensuring that women experience a
positive change in their lives as a result of their participation in credit programs.
An additional aspect of credit programs that has been largely ignored by the literature is the
potential impact of the savings activities by women. Each member of a credit program is
required to put aside money in different savings schemes. At Grameen, for example,
borrowers have to deposit five percent of each loan as well as one taka every week into a
Group Fund21 . An individual group member can borrow from this fund for any need, but she
has to have the consent of all members and the group together decides the terms and
conditions of these loans. This arrangement is expected to accustom members to the
discipline of saving and provide an "essential experience in the collective management of
20 A common--but mistaken--belief is that a man can divorce a woman in an Islamic marriage by merely
pronouncing the words "Talak, talak, talak".
21 All members of a group must also purchase a Grameen Bank share (costing Tk 100 or US$2.5) when the
accumulated savings in their Group Fund exceeds Tk. 600. These shares remain in member's savings
permanently and cannot be taken out as a loan. This arrangement ensures ownership of the bank by its
member. In 1992, members owned 88% of the Bank's shares (Mizan 1994).
finances" (Hossain 1988, p. 26). By December 1993, the Group Fund had accumulated Taka
2,117 million or over US$50 million (see Table 2, p. 16). A sum equivalent to 25% of the
amount charged by Grameen as interest on an individual loan is deposited by the borrower
into an Emergency Fund which provides insurance against default, illness, accident, death,
disability, and other unforeseen events. A group can claim up to Taka 2,500 from the
Emergency Fund on behalf of a member. By December 1993, approximately Taka 217
million or about US$5 million had been accumulated in this fund. BRAC has similar
arrangements, with some differences in rates and terms and conditions of the funds.
Individual women's annual savings at Grameen averaged Taka 1,293 in 1994 (Khandker,
Khalily and Khan 1995). Again, with per capita GNP standing at about Taka 8,000, this sum
represents a substantial amount of money for women, especially for those who have been
saving for five years or more. White (1991) suggests that members are often unaware of
exactly how much money they have in their savings accounts, being satisfied only with the
fact that they have something put aside for emergencies. Encouraging this savings habit and
making women more aware of how much they have accumulated and what this might imply
for their sense of economic security and financial independence is another way organizations
can promote empowerment.
In addition to savings, organizations can also ensure that women's assets are increased as a
result of participation in credit programs. For example, even if the loan is used to buy a
rickshaw that her husband drives or land that her husband cultivates, these assets can be
placed under the woman's name. Both BRAC and Grameen already practice this. However,
the key is to make women aware of the fact that these assets belong to them and that they
have the right to do what they want with it. This way, even if the woman is not using the
loan, she nevertheless builds up assets that give her economic security.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Concluding Remarks
Credit programs designed according to the Grameen Bank model have the potential to
empower women by (1) giving them opportunities to earn cash incomes, and therefore to be
valued more by their husbands and their society; and (2) providing them with other more
intangible resources of solidarity, self-esteem, social networks, and awareness of their human
and legal rights. However, the evidence of male appropriation of credit shows that this does
not happen automatically when women are merely targeted for credit. Where men take over
women's loans, a number of scenarios are possible, some of which bring about positive
changes in women's lives and others which place them in situations of greater dependency and
subordination. The tendency in evaluations to overlook or de-emphasize the phenomenon of
male appropriation is made possible by the fact that the standard indicators used to measure
success--high repayment rates, level of women's income and level of women's employment--
do not allow evaluators to gauge whether women are using the loans themselves or not.
Organizations have employed different strategies to try and ensure that women are involved
in the loan financed activity--the Grameen Bank by encouraging women to invest in
traditional "women's activities", and BRAC by developing economic sub-sectors. Both
strategies have faced problems: identifying what is a "woman's" activity is difficult; managing
entire economic sub-sectors calls for managerial and marketing expertise that these
organizations are not well equipped with; and stringent regulation and control of loan use
restricts the maneuvering capacity that credit often provides for women. Until the
institutional and cultural barriers that prevent women from investing in productive activities
and accessing the market are broken, and until gender relations are changed to allow for
possibilities like the fact that women could be employed even when their husbands are not, it
will continue to be difficult for organizations to control loan use.
There are definite steps that organizations can take to ensure that the empowering effects of
credit programs are maximized. This can be done by encouraging women to gain knowledge
of the market, of accounting practices, of prices and profitability of economic ventures, even
if they are not in charge of them. It can also be done through the building up of assets like
savings, land and capital, as well as through the consciousness raising and awareness building
efforts that these two organizations have developed. The only way these can be achieved,
however, is if they are made into explicit goals of the programs, and consequently, if
indicators for their measurement are developed and utilized in standard impact evaluations of
the programs.
Credit programs have made significant achievements in providing women with access to a
scarce resource. However, this paper has shown the limitations of using credit programs as a
strategy for women's empowerment. Even if the organizations were able to increase women's
knowledge of business practices and raise their awareness of their situations and of their
rights, it is important to realize that credit could end up perpetuating existing gender
differentials. Women's work continues to be undervalued in Bangladeshi society. As cited
earlier, although women already work 10 to 14 hours a day in economic activities, their
contribution to the household and national economy is not measured in cash terms and hence
not considered of economic value. Increasing the number of hours that women work, as credit
programs are doing--and especially if this is in areas that are still considered traditional
"women's" activities like livestock/poultry rearing and vegetable growing--does not change the
perception of the value of women's work. Increasing women's labour hours also does not
change the existing division of domestic responsibilities. There is little evidence that men take
on more domestic chores when their wives start investing loans in productive enterprises.
This means that women have to carry out their loan financed activities in addition to all their
responsibilities in looking after the homestead and the children. Similarly, where female wage
labourers earn 40% of what male wage labourers earn, increasing opportunities for women to
work outside their homes, without changing these conditions, perpetuates severe inequalities
in the value of women's work.
Kabeer (1994) speaks of the need for women, and for those interested in empowering women,
to focus on building on the "power within" to address this institutional and cultural
devaluation of the worth of women.
Power lies not only in men's ability to mobilize material sources from a variety of arenas
in order to promote their individual and gender interests, but also in their ability to
construct the "rules of the game" in ways that disguise the operations of this power and
construct the illusion of consensus and complementarity. (Kabeer 1994, p. 229)
To combat this, Kabeer emphasizes that only when women join forces with each other, build
alliances and networks, and act collectively to express their needs and interests, will a true
transformation take place. The organizational capacity of women is seen as a vital instrument
for women to become active participants in the development process--capable of identifying
their own agendas and developing strategies that are appropriate to women's circumstances--
as opposed to being mere recipients of the benefits of pre-designed social projects (usually
determined by men who dominate the staff of development programs). However, this
capacity has to be built up as a conscious process.
Grameen style credit programs, through a design that emphasizes group solidarity and by
including awareness building and consciousness raising activities as a part of their activities,
takes this process only one step. With internal pressures of rapid expansion (increasing the
numbers of loans and loanees) and donor pressures for economic sustainability (maintaining
high repayment rates and increasing profitability), even these ancillary activities and the
"intangible" resources they provide for women are in danger of being traded off.22 This paper
has highlighted the fact that empowerment, which in effect entails fundamental social change,
is a subtle and complex process, and the cause-and-effect relationship between credit and
empowerment is not as simple as has been assumed. Unless credit programs focus directly
on the finer--and consequently more elusive and difficult to measure--micro details of social
change, their impact on women's empowerment will remain limited.
22 See Ebdon 1995, Kuriakose 1995, White 1991, for the implications of NGO expansion on empowerment
goals of credit programs.
ANNEX
Impact Evaluations Studied
Date Authors/Affiliation Organizations Studied Sample Size Impact evaluated
1995 R. I. Rahman and Shahid Khandker Grameen Bank, BRAC, BRDB 1,798 households/ Employment
BIDS, World Bank 4,715 individuals Productivity
1995 Brooke Ackerly Grameen Bank, BRAC, Save 613 women participants Loan use
the Children (SCF) Women's empowerment
1994 Mark Pitt and Shahid Khandker Grameen Bank, BRAC, BRDB 1,798 households/ General
BIDS, World Bank 4,715 individuals
1994 Sidney Schuler and Syed Hashemi Grameen Bank, BRAC 1,305 women Women's empowerment
Fertility
1994 Ann Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Grameen Bank, BRAC, 253 women participants Loan use and control
Gupta BRDB, Thangemara Mohila
Institute of Development Studies, Sebuj Sengstha (TMSS)
Sussex
1994 A. Nahar Mizan Grameen Bank 100 women participants, Women's empowerment
100 non-participants
1991 Sarah White ActionAid, Gono Kallyan General
Overseas Development Institute Trust, Gono Unnayan
Prochesta, CARITAS
1989 Mahabub Hossain and Rita Afsar Grameen Bank, BRAC, Women
BIDS BRDB, Proshika, Women's Economic
Entrepreneurship Dev. Prog,
Swanirvar
1988 Mahabub Hossain Grameen Bank 534 women participants Economic
BIDS, IFPRI
1986 R. I. Rahman Grameen Bank 151 women participants Women
BIDS Economic
1986 Atiur Rahman Grameen Bank 150 men Consciousness-raising
BIDS 150 women efforts
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